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Today, organizations use of e-commerce tools for purchasing and sales have developed from e-catalogs 
and e-mail to e-auctions. This research simulated such a fully automated negotiation system for business 
transactions to test the best overtime policies to use with different decision rules for price and due date. 
Software within e-commerce systems negotiates prices and due dates using pre-thought out negotiation 
strategies. This research tests tested the effect of several overtime policies with different price and due date 
negotiation strategies.  It used a simulation of a job shop and an imaginary market to demonstrate how one 
can compare different combinations of overtime policies and negotiation strategies in different markets.  It 
extends previous research by including the option of using flexible overtime both at the quotation stage and 
during shop operation. The research suggested that simulation testing of negotiation and overtime 
strategies for firms and their markets is a practical way of choosing overtime policies.   
 





One aim of e-commerce is to put most business functions on an electronic basis and minimize the use of 
human time.  One repetitive business function involving human time is negotiation.  For example, in a 
typical market with many buyers and sellers, each buyer wants to get the best (to the buyer‟s firm) 
combination of specifications, delivery, payment terms, price, and other factors for all of the firm‟s 
purchases. Ideally each seller wants to sell its capacity to a combination of buyers that maximizes the 
selling firm‟s profits, both in the short term and long term. The most thorough and potentially efficient way 
to achieve this is for each purchase to be negotiated. These negotiations are complicated as they are often 
not just two party interactions and have many points of negotiation.  To extend the example, each buyer is 
probably negotiating with several sellers to get the best deal for the buying organization. This may include 
trying to play one seller off against another. Each seller is probably negotiating its capacity with several 
buyers and trying to play each buyer off against the other. Peleg, Lee, and Hausman (2002) describe the 
situation well from the buyer‟s viewpoint.  
Further complications arise because in most business-to-business (B2B) markets the same buyers and 
sellers often interact over many possible deals over time. Thus, there is a snowball effect in which the result 
of any negotiation and contract implementation affects subsequent interactions. This reputation effect 
impacts how other sellers and buyers react during future negotiations.  Because of the marked complexity, 
full negotiation is often used only for important transactions, where the investment of time and money is 
justified. When the cost of the negotiation is greater than the profit arising from it, firms use less expensive 
strategies such as standard prices and lead times in e-marketplaces (Harrington 2000, Kilbane 2001, 
Konicki 2000), auctions (Beam and Segev 1998, Kumar and Feldman 1999, Atkinson 2000, Thomas 2000, 
Davis 2001, and reverse auctions (Porter 2000a, b). 
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This paper‟s premise is that if organizations could inexpensively conduct full negotiation through electronic 
means then they would benefit greatly (Herniter, Carmel, and Nunamaker 1993). This paper now gives an 
overview of the current state of e-negotiation research, starting with papers on general e-negotiation before 




This section first describes what some authors believe is the tools that general and e-negotiation can use. 
Then it looks at research supporting the specific case of e-negotiation for a job shop with flexible overtime 
that the paper simulates. 
 
Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) 
 
The most basic type of e-negotiation uses a Negotiation Support System (Lim and Benbaset 1992, Perkens 
et al. 1996).  Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) concluded that parties using a NSS made more integrative 
agreements, which maximizes the utility of the bargain for all the parties involved.  Kersten and 
Szpakowicz (1998) and Kersten and Noronha (1998) defined a NSS as consisting of two parts, a decision 
support function and a communication support function. Kersten and Noronha (1999) compared software 
agents and decision support systems for both distributive (fixed pie) and integrative (jointly benefit) 
negotiations. They stated that most work has been done on supporting distributive negotiations, whilst most 
real life negotiations are of both types at different stages in the process. The next more complex tools for e-




Oliver (1996) considered that if intelligent agents can carry out simple negotiations then many more 
transactions (like booking hotel rooms) would be negotiated. He stated that such agents should be given 
initial bargaining strategies then allowed to develop better ones through learning. He suggested that genetic 
algorithms may be used for these learning mechanisms, and that the use of practice forums would assist in 
this learning. Goh, Teo, Wu, and Wei (2000) found in experiments that electronic agents obtained 
outcomes comparable to but not better than unassisted humans in both types of negotiations, integrative and 
distributive.  The next step in complexity for e-negotiation is automated negotiation systems, as described 
by Sandholm (1999). 
 
Automated Negotiation Systems 
 
Beam and Segev (1996, 1997) defined how automated negotiation could be used within electronic 
commerce. They stated that there are two main problems; one standard terminology so that intelligent 
agents speak the same language, and the second is determining how to keep negotiating strategies secret.  
Zeng and Sycara (1998) discussed the development of autonomous agents capable of learning from 
experience, where negotiations a sequential activity.  They suggested that game theory is too limiting for 
real life negotiation modeling, especially as more than two parties are normally involved.  
Lo and Kersten (1999) reported on negotiation software agents (NSA) that represent their users and can 
make offers and counter offers. The MIT Media Lab developed a rule-based agent for negotiation in a 
predefined market with a given set of rules. They used a neutral third party agent with history of previous 
negotiations to propose agreements beneficial to both parties, as well as a NSS for both parties.  Kersten, 
Noronha, and Teich (2000) believed that what e-commerce really needs is a combination of auctions and 
traditional bilateral negotiations. 
Thus, in this present time of change, where most business-to-business quotation and purchasing, including 
job shop orders, will be soon done over the web, Anders (1999)  stated that firms should have a quotation 
and negotiation strategy.  However, as the market changes so rapidly these strategies have to change 
rapidly as well.  Moreover for make-to-order (MTO) products, price and due date quotation strategies can 
have an immediate effect on company survival.  
I
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For as Kingsman et al. (1996) wrote, "the process of dealing with customer enquiries so as to attract a 
sufficient load of profitable work is the essential problem for MTO companies".  Thus firms should test 
proposed new negotiation strategies before going online with them. 
   
Demand Management in a Job Shop 
 
There are many methods that a firm could use in the quotation and negotiation process, such as Matsui‟s 
(1985) order selection policies, Wang, Yang, and Lee‟s (1994) neural network approach, Weng‟s (1996) 
lead-time rules, Akkan‟s (1997) finite capacity planning, Kingsman and de Souza‟s (1997) knowledge 
based decision support system, Kingsman and Mercer‟s (1997) strike rate matrices, Litoiu and Tadei‟s 
(1997) fuzzy due dates, Blocher et al‟s (1998) order scheduling in a job shop, Hendry, Kingsman, and 
Cheung‟s (1998) workload control, Li, Ip, and Wang‟s (1998) genetic algorithms, So and Song‟s (1998) 
use of delivery time guarantees, Weng‟s (1998) lead-time management methods, Zapfel‟s (1998) customer 
order driven scheduling, Spearman and Zhang‟s (1999) optimal lead time policies, and Webster‟s (2002) 




Buckle and Meads (1991), Dar-El, Sofer, Molcho, and Shtrichman (1991), Lawrence (1994), and Ozdamar 
and Yazgac (1997) considered that when a job runs late, the firm will complete the tardy order with 
overtime, subcontracting, or some other method of expedited production.   
 
Adshead and Price (1989) investigated the use of overtime in a make-to-stock shop to find how a change in 
overtime decision policies alters the cost performance of the shop.  They stated that the management of 
overtime differs from other areas of production control, like scheduling or stock control because of the 
tendency for much of overtime control to be on an “ad hoc" fire-fighting basis.  Adshead and Price reported 
that there is much anecdotal evidence to show that production managers highly value the ability to adjust 
the level of overtime quickly.  They concluded that a policy to use overtime when a job cannot meet its due 
date without overtime is preferred to a policy to schedule overtime when the aggregate load on the shop 
exceeds the shop‟s capacity.  They considered that this is because the first policy needs less overtime and 
has less stock-out.  However, they wrote the one major problem with flexible overtime is that workers 
dislike rapid variations in overtime.   
 
This paper demonstrates that simulation, which has been used extensively to test shop floor rules, can be 
used to compare and test new negotiation and overtime strategies for both electronic (Croson 1999) and 
human negotiation.  It demonstrates how to carry out such a comparison using Moodie‟s negotiation 
simulation of a classic job shop (1999) but with flexible overtime. A major criticism of Moodie‟s paper is 
that it ignores this point that shops that are tardy in delivering a job will often use overtime to catch up. 




The basic model and terminology for this study is that of Moodie (1999), from which Figure 1 is copied, 
which simulates the demand management situation for a job shop without the option of overtime where 
lead-time and price is variable.  
As de Treville, Shapiro, & Hameri, (2004) said, firms must give the lead times customers will pay for.  The 
following description is taken from parts of Moodie‟s paper with changes from that model noted in detail. 
The demand manager agent performs three tasks in the model. First, the demand manager estimates the 
firm's maximum price for a given due date curve for the job request.  Second, the demand manager must 
decide on a bargaining approach, which is whether or not to haggle over the price and the due date.  The 
firm replies to the customer's bid request with its initial bid quotation.  The demand manager and customer 
may then negotiate or bargain.   
I
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During any negotiation, both the firm and the customer know their own, but not each other‟s, reservation 
trade-off curve between price and due date.  Figure 2 (copied from Raiffa 1992: 155) shows these trade-off 
curves for price and due date, with any combination of price and due date within the feasible region could 
provide the agreed bid result.  If there is no feasible region then the customer goes elsewhere for its 
requirement.   
Firms' Minimum Trade-Off Curve
Most Likely Point of 
Agreement with Equal 
Bargainers
Customer's Maximum Trade-off 
Curve
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Akkan (1997) writes that "a system that allows rejection of customer orders must facilitate negotiation of 
delivery times".  The model assumes that if the parties finally agree then the agreement is in the center of 
the feasible region, where both mutually benefit the most.  
 
Third, if the customer places an order then the demand manager places the new job order into the schedule, 
if used.  The research assumes that the firm negotiates only one order at one time; there is no simultaneous 
negotiation or contingent bidding. The simulation releases the orders to the shop immediately as 
recommended by Melnyk and Ragatz (1998), Philipoom, and Fry (1992), and Tsai et al. (1997).  The model 
dispatches jobs with the earliest operation due date rule (EODD), as Conway and Maxwell (1962) 
recommended.  The main output measure is net revenue rate, which is the total of the gross revenue for all 
products that the firm delivers in a period minus variable (to the study) costs including overtime.  Normal 
time labor costs are assumed fixed.   
The research assumes arbitrarily that the modeled shop has the flexibility of working overtime on any 
workcenter at the rate of up to 50% of normal working time with a cost based on increased rates.  This 50% 
increase, for example, represents extending an eight-hour shift to a twelve-hour shift, using the same labor 
and is a significant increase in available capacity.  When an operation is running behind its planned start 
time, then the firm can use overtime on that operation as necessary to get that operation back on schedule.  
The model charges the cost of that overtime, at an overtime charge rate of OTCR, against the net revenue 
for that period.  The overtime used is the lesser of the amount that the job is tardy or the availability of 
overtime for that workstation.  The problem is when to consider that a job is running tardy and thus needs 
overtime.   
 
The demand manager, especially if an electronic agent, must know how to conduct each of these tasks.  In 
other words, the firm must have a negotiation strategy.  With overtime, a negotiation strategy consists of 
five parts.  The first is deciding what due date estimation method to use.  The second is deciding what 
overtime policy to adopt.  The third is deciding what overtime scheduling rule the shop floor should follow. 
The fourth is deciding over what factors, price and due date, to bargain.  The fifth is deciding on the values 
of management options, such as normal time and overtime charge rates.  We shall discuss the first three 
tasks next.  
Due Date Estimation 
 
The demand manager must choose a due date estimation method to compute early due dates, based on the 
expected processing times (EPTs) for each workstation that the potential job would visit and present time 
(TNOW).  The simulation's actual operation processing times differ from the expected processing times.  
The experiments use the five due date estimation methods that dominated in Moodie‟s research.  
 
Table 1 - Previously Suggested Due Date Estimation Methods 
 
Name  # Acronym Due Date Estimation Equation Reference 
Total Work 1 TWK FEDD = TNOW + TEPT *  (1 +  QL) Conway, Maxwell, 
& Miller [57] 
Work in System 2 WIS FEDD = TNOW + TEPT + EPT * i {1 + QLi} Salegna [62] 
where    EPT is expected operation processing time 
TEPT is total expected processing time for a job, 
QL is expected queue length, 
i is job operation number, 
X is the mean for value X for all requirements. 
 
The first two due date estimation methods are based on finite capacity schedules, described by Vig and 
Dooley (1991).  They are either LFN (forward loading) or SFN (forward scheduling).  With forward 
loading, the scheduler adds up the little slices of spare time on a machine schedule that occur after the 
earliest start date of the job until the total is more than the expected processing time for that operation.   
I
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That time becomes the expected finishing time for the operation.  With forward scheduling, the scheduler 
fits the job's operation into the first gap larger than the expected processing time to produce the expected 
finishing time.  The simulation does not move already scheduled operations to fit in a new operation.  Table 
1 details the two previously suggested simple due date estimation methods used.  
 
The other due date estimation method used is aggregate loading (AGL).  AGL uses a rough, aggregate 
schedule, which consists of segments of time or buckets containing previously loaded jobs.  The capacity of 
a bucket is the sum of each workcenters' capacity.  AGL forward loads the new job into unfilled time 
buckets from TNOW, until the number of time buckets loaded equal or surpasses the job's TEPT.  For 
example, if a job's TEPT is 5.6, then the planned due date is when the program finishes loading that job into 




The previous research‟s (Moodie 1999) results represent a no overtime policy (Policy 0), which is the base 
case for comparison.  The paper now describes policies that use overtime in detail tested in the simulation. 
Each policy results in a different way of determining the firm‟s minimum price for a given due date trade-
off curve.   
The first two policies are ones that ignore overtime at the quotation stage, but then uses overtime in an 
emergency manner to make sure tardy jobs finish on time.  The research tries this both with a full 
bargaining and a price only bargaining approach.  The first (Policy 1) with a price only bargaining 
approach, results in the simple L-shaped curve of Figure 3 and uses, based on a standard charge rate (SCR), 
total expected processing time (TEPT), one price (F2MP = SCR * TEPT), and one estimated due date 
(F1DD).   
Figure 3
Firm's Minimum Net Price to Due Date Trade-off Curve

















The second (Policy 2), where the firm also bargains about the due date, results in the three-part curve of 
Figure 4.  The curve involves estimating two due-dates.  The first due date (F1DD) assumes that there is a 
50% chance of using overtime.  The first due date requires a price (F1MP), which includes a premium to 
the minimum price, based on a quarter of the overtime charge rate (OTCR) multiplied by TEPT.  The 
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The second internal due-date (F2DD) adds the uncertainty allowance (UNCL) multiplied by estimated lead 
time to obtain a later time that is unlikely to need overtime.  A diagonal line connecting point {F1DD, 
F1MP} to point {F2DD, F2MP} shows the trade-off line between these two due dates.   
Figure 4
Firm's Minimum Net Price to Due Date Trade-off Curve
























The third (Policy 3) uses planned overtime in the quotation process if the customer rejects the original 
quotation and uses full bargaining.  However, the policy also involves a further step in the negotiation 
process.  If the customer rejects the original quotation because of too late a due date, then the model 
calculates a new internal early due date, which is based on completing the job using only overtime.  This 
represents either doing the job completely in overtime or more likely bumping other jobs into overtime in 
order to complete this job.  The simulation repeats the negotiation stage with the new earlier due date 
(F3DD) but increases the price rate by the overtime surcharge rate (OTCR * TEPT).  This generates the 
firm‟s new minimum trade-off curve of Figure 5.  The minimum price (F3MP) for F3DD is F3MP + OTCR 
* TEPT.  A diagonal line connecting point {F1DD, F1MP} to point {F3DD, F3MP} is the extra part of the 
trade-off.   
Figure 5
Firm's Minimum Net Price to Due Date Trade-off Curve
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The four policies are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 - The Composition of the Different Overtime Policies 
Policy Use Overtime Bargain on Due Date Use Overtime in Quotation 
0 No Yes No 
1 Yes No No 
2 Yes Yes No 
3 Yes Yes Yes 
 
Overtime Scheduling Rules 
 
The research uses four possible overtime shop floor scheduling rules that can schedule overtime when a job 
is likely to be tardy.  The first rule (A), delayed next operation (DNO), is that if a job will finish (using 
actual processing time) after its scheduled start time for its next operation (or its delivery due date if it is in 
its last stage), then schedule overtime.  The amount the job will be tardy starting the next required operation 
(or being delivered if at its last stage), is the amount the job is tardy for the present operation.  This rule is 
often impossible to apply, as it requires the shop to have knowledge of future unknowns.  However, the 
experiments use it to show what effect perfect future knowledge would have 
The second rule (B), called late operation start (LOS), is that if a job starts late, and then schedule overtime.  
The amount the operation is tardy in starting an operation is the amount the job is tardy for that operation.  
The third rule (C), called late operation finish (LOF), is that if a job finishes after its scheduled finish time 
for that operation then schedule overtime.  The amount the operation finishes tardy is the amount the job is 
tardy.   
The fourth rule (D), expected delay to next operation (EDN), is that if a job is expected (using expected 
processing time) to finish after its scheduled start time for its next operation (or its delivery due date if it is 
in its last stage) then schedule overtime.  The amount the operation is expected to be tardy starting the next 
required operation (or being delivered if at its last stage) is the amount the job is tardy for the existing 
operation.   
These four rules are derived from results of two decisions.  The first decision is can the shop floor 
controller use the actual processing time (APT), as opposed to the expected processing time.  The second 
decision is should the shop floor controller consider the next operation‟s planned start time (NOP).  The 
four rules answer the two decisions, as follows in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 - Different Shop Floor Overtime Rules 
Name Designation Acronym Use APT Use NOP 
Delayed Next Operation A DNO Yes Yes 
Late Operation Start B LOS No No 
Late Operation Finish C LOF Yes No 
Expected Delay to Next 
operation 
D EDN No Yes 
 
The main output measure, as in Moodie (1999), is net revenue rate, which is the total of the gross revenue 
for all products that the firm delivers in a period minus variable costs including overtime.  Normal time 
labor costs are assumed fixed.  The adjusted model assumes arbitrarily that the modeled shop has the 
flexibility of working overtime on any workcenter at the rate of up to 50% of normal working time with a 




All statistical decisions such as run lengths, which are based on Fishman‟s (1978) method number of 
simulation runs (30 per each situation), random number seeds, choice of variables, etc. are as in Moodie‟s 
(1999) paper.  The initial experiments assisted in the selection of suitable arbitrary high and low values for 
each of nine variables that set each scenario.   
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The next experiment used these choices of high and low values for each market scenario variable to predict 
the four most influential variables, and thus determined the sixteen test market scenarios for the main 
experiment.  Each of these sixteen test scenarios has a label of four letters, where each letter represents the 
level of a variable value for a scenario dimension.  These letters are “H” for runs with the high value of the 
variable and “L” for those using the low value of the variable.  Table 4 shows the low and high variable 
values for each varied scenario dimension (with mean acronym in brackets).   
 











They are in sequence of importance: demand, represented by average inter-arrival time (AIAT); accuracy, 
represented the average error in estimating processing times (PERR); premium, represented by the average 
premium rate that customers will pay extra for early delivery (PREM; and responsiveness, represented by 
how short a lead time customers want on average (RESP).  For example, the scenario acronym LLHL 
represents where AIAT is 1, the low value; PERR is 0.1, the low value; PREM is 6, the high value; and 
RESP is 3, the low value.   
 
The main experiment has several objectives.  The first objective is to find the set of values for the 
management options for each combination of test scenario, due date estimation method, and bargaining 
approach, that maximizes the net revenue rate.  The second objective is to find the best negotiation strategy 
for each test scenario, which is the combination of due date estimation method, bargaining approach, and 
values of the management option that maximizes the net revenue rate.   
 
The third objective is to examine the consequences of sub-optimal choices for the management options.  
The fourth objective is to examine the selection of due date estimation methods in the context of scenario 
dimensions.  An inferior choice for any part of a negotiating strategy gives a lower net revenue rate, 
whatever the choices for the other parts in all scenarios.  The demand manager can therefore ignore any 
inferior choice in future decisions.   
 
Most combinations of due date estimation methods and bargaining approaches require that the demand 
manager select values for the management options.  The experimenter must therefore decide how many 
different and what values to use for these options.  Early runs of the main experiment suggest that it should 
use a minimum of eleven values of UNCL, five values of SCR, and six values of OTCR.  As the plots of 
revenue rates versus the value of a particular management option show a raise, the experimenter tests extra 
values of management options in the direction of increasing revenue until the net revenue rate starts to fall.  
So some combinations of method, approach, and scenario require the use of extra values. 
 
This experiment compares three policies (and the base policy for which the results already exist), four 
rules, five methods, and sixteen test scenarios.  This gives sixty combinations of method, policy, and rule 
for each scenario.  Each combination is compared to the base policy results for its scenario.  For each 
combination and scenario, the demand manager has to make a decision on the charge rates and, if needed, 
the extra uncertainty time allowance for each job to maximize the net revenue rate.  The data for thirty 
simulation runs is recorded for each combination and scenario using these values to allow a full statistical 
investigation of the results.  The next section summarizes the voluminous results.  
Dimension  Acronym LOW 
Value 
HIGH Value Units 
Demand AIAT 1 2 time 
Accuracy PERR 10 50 % (TEPT) 
Premium PREM 2 6 money/EPT 
Responsiveness RESP 3 9 time/EPT 
I
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Table 5 shows the abbreviations used in reporting the simulation results.  
 
Table 5 – Abbreviations used in results 
 
Policy Num. Overtime Policy Rule Letter Overtime Rule Method Scheduling method 
B 0 No overtime DNO A Overtime with allowance AGL Aggregate Loading 
O 1 
Overtime with no 
allowance. LOS B 
Overtime with no 
allowance JTW TWK + JIQ 
OB 2 
Overtime with  
allowance LOF C 
Overtime with no 
allowance LFN 
Forward Loading, No 
move 
OBQ 3 Quote overtime jobs EDN D 




 TWK Total Work 
 
Tables 6 – 21 show the detailed results for each scenario with the highest revenue rate in bold, together 
with the best and second best combination of scheduling method and overtime policy. 
  
Table 6 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 1 – LLLL 
 
 Policy 
Method  O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 68.8 69.9 70.6 70.6 69.9 69.5 70.1 70.2 69.4 72.4 72.2 71.2 72.3 72.4 
JTW 71.6 70.0 73.0 70.0 69.2 70.4 71.1 70.4 74.0 74.7 81.2 77.9 74.0 81.2 
LFN 68.9 64.4 63.0 56.9 62.2 69.8 70.5 66.8 69.3 70.0 71.4 67.7 69.4 71.4 
SFN 67.2 63.8 62.1 55.4 60.7 69.2 69.8 67.6 68.6 69.0 70.9 66.3 68.5 70.9 
TWK 67.9 65.8 72.3 63.9 63.8 70.3 74.2 69.4 69.4 69.0 73.4 69.6 69.4 74.2 
Best 71.6 70.0 73.0 70.6 69.9 70.4 74.2 70.4 74.0 74.7 81.2 77.9 74.0 81.2 
Best combination is Method JT with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy3C 
 
Table 7 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 2 – LLLH 
 
 Policy 
Method  O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 77.1 70.3 70.6 70.6 70.3 69.6 68.8 68.8 69.0 78.7 78.7 78.5 78.6 78.7 
JTW 76.2 76.0 76.2 75.9 75.9 75.2 75.2 75.1 80.4 80.6 88.3 86.4 80.4 88.3 
LFN 74.3 72.6 73.4 69.4 72.3 75.8 76.7 74.7 75.7 75.9 77.7 74.7 75.5 77.7 
SFN 74.0 73.7 73.9 69.4 72.5 75.9 76.8 74.6 75.6 75.9 77.8 74.1 75.5 77.8 
TWK 77.6 79.2 82.1 60.8 78.2 77.4 80.0 76.9 76.9 76.4 80.2 76.7 76.6 82.1 
Best 77.6 79.2 82.1 75.9 78.2 77.4 80.0 76.9 80.4 80.6 88.3 86.4 80.4 88.3 
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Table 8 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 3 – LLHL 
 
Policy 
Method O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 79.8 64.4 63.0 62.8 63.7 73.8 72.9 72.7 73.3 85.9 84.9 83.5 85.0 85.9 
JTW 83.6 82.9 86.2 82.6 81.6 83.5 84.4 83.3 85.1 86.1 90.7 86.4 85.1 90.7 
LFN 80.2 76.7 75.0 68.2 73.8 81.7 82.3 75.8 80.6 81.5 82.5 77.6 79.9 82.5 
SFN 77.0 76.0 74.0 66.6 72.9 80.1 80.7 78.1 79.1 79.0 80.3 75.0 78.4 80.7 
TWK 78.1 79.3 86.6 77.2 77.2 82.7 88.6 81.2 81.2 80.9 87.4 81.1 81.3 88.6 
Best 83.6 82.9 86.6 82.6 81.6 83.5 88.6 83.3 85.1 86.1 90.7 86.4 85.1 90.7 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy 2B 
 
Table 9 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 4 – LLHH 
 
Policy 
Method O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 93.6 82.8 82.4 82.2 82.5 83.4 82.6 82.8 82.8 96.5 94.2 93.9 93.8 96.5 
JTW 92.3 92.6 92.9 92.6 92.5 90.0 90.3 90.0 96.1 96.6 102.4 99.8 96.1 102.4 
LFN 89.8 89.1 89.6 84.5 88.0 90.5 91.5 88.2 89.9 90.6 92.5 88.3 90.3 92.5 
SFN 88.4 89.6 89.3 84.5 87.4 90.7 91.8 88.5 89.7 90.2 92.3 88.0 90.0 92.3 
TWK 94.0 96.7 101.0 95.8 95.8 95.6 97.2 95.0 95.0 95.0 97.5 95.1 95.3 101.0 
Best 94.0 96.7 101.0 95.8 95.8 95.6 97.2 95.0 96.1 96.6 102.4 99.8 96.1 102.4 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy 1B 
 




d O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 59.4 45.5 42.3 41.6 44.8 56.2 55.2 55.1 55.0 66.2 64.5 63.2 64.9 66.2 
JTW 64.9 61.6 65.0 60.0 58.5 64.5 65.2 64.7 65.2 66.7 71.4 68.3 65.2 71.4 
LFN 59.6 54.2 52.9 47.5 51.5 63.7 64.8 60.5 62.5 63.0 64.7 61.5 61.4 64.8 
SFN 58.0 54.1 51.5 46.4 50.8 62.0 63.5 61.8 61.3 61.5 63.7 60.0 60.2 63.7 
TWK 57.2 57.2 60.8 53.5 53.5 61.5 64.4 59.6 59.6 59.6 62.6 59.8 59.7 64.4 
Best 64.9 61.6 65.0 60.0 58.5 64.5 65.2 64.7 65.2 66.7 71.4 68.3 65.2 71.4 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3C 
 
Table 11 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 6 - LHLH 
 
Policy 
Method O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 69.6 67.0 67.2 67.2 66.9 63.5 62.4 63.6 63.2 72.6 72.8 72.1 72.0 72.8 
JTW 70.2 70.1 70.7 70.2 70.1 68.0 68.3 68.2 72.3 72.7 79.4 77.6 72.3 79.4 
LFN 65.5 64.4 66.0 62.7 63.5 70.1 71.6 68.9 69.2 69.6 71.6 69.1 68.5 71.6 
SFN 64.0 64.7 66.2 62.6 64.3 69.9 71.6 69.4 69.1 68.9 71.5 68.4 68.4 71.6 
TWK 68.4 70.6 73.2 68.3 68.3 69.8 70.7 68.9 68.9 68.8 70.7 68.9 68.8 73.2 
Best 70.2 70.6 73.2 70.2 70.1 70.1 71.6 69.4 72.3 72.7 79.4 77.6 72.3 79.4 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3C 
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d O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 69.2 54.6 51.4 49.9 53.3 64.7 63.0 62.9 63.4 76.6 74.7 72.6 75.8 76.6 
JTW 75.5 72.6 76.3 70.9 69.4 75.5 77.3 75.5 74.0 76.2 80.2 76.1 74.0 80.2 
LFN 68.8 65.0 63.6 56.6 61.6 73.7 74.7 66.7 71.4 72.6 73.6 68.8 70.6 74.7 
SFN 66.5 64.6 62.0 55.5 60.9 72.0 72.1 69.6 69.2 70.4 72.1 67.0 68.5 72.1 
TWK 69.0 69.2 73.8 64.7 64.7 72.6 76.2 69.1 69.1 69.1 75.1 69.6 69.1 76.2 
Best 75.5 72.6 76.3 70.9 69.4 75.5 77.3 75.5 74.0 76.6 80.2 76.1 75.8 80.2 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 2B 
 




d O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 84.2 75.1 74.8 75.0 74.9 75.7 75.0 74.9 75.4 87.0 87.3 85.8 86.6 87.3 
JTW 84.3 84.6 85.1 84.6 84.4 82.7 83.5 83.3 86.1 86.7 92.3 90.5 86.1 92.3 
LFN 78.8 79.2 80.6 76.4 78.4 82.9 85.1 81.2 81.9 82.9 85.3 81.7 81.4 85.3 
SFN 77.3 79.7 80.3 76.1 77.8 83.0 84.7 82.0 81.3 81.7 84.4 80.6 80.5 84.7 
TWK 84.7 85.3 89.1 83.3 83.4 86.0 88.3 83.9 83.9 84.3 87.7 84.3 84.4 89.1 
Best 84.7 85.3 89.1 84.6 84.4 86.0 88.3 83.9 86.1 87.0 92.3 90.5 86.6 92.3 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3C 
 
Table 14 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario91 - HLLL 
 
Policy  
Method  O 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 50.1 35.4 32.7 31.9 33.6 45.3 45.0 45.2 45.0 49.1 49.3 48.9 48.9 50.1 
JTW 49.4 49.3 48.0 46.1 47.1 49.6 49.6 49.6 52.9 53.8 53.8 53.1 52.9 53.8 
LFN 49.7 46.0 43.1 38.8 43.5 49.2 49.1 47.8 48.9 49.9 50.0 48.4 49.6 50.0 
SFN 48.5 45.3 42.0 38.0 43.1 48.6 48.6 48.3 48.3 49.1 49.6 47.4 48.9 49.6 
TWK 50.8 48.3 50.5 46.8 46.8 51.9 52.7 51.6 51.6 51.6 52.6 52.3 52.4 52.7 
Best 50.8 49.3 50.5 46.8 47.1 51.9 52.7 51.6 52.9 53.8 53.8 53.1 52.9 53.8 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JT with Policy 3A 
 
Table 15 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 10 - HLLH 
 
Policy 
Method 0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 55.5 48.7 48.4 47.9 48.6 49.7 50.1 50.2 49.5 52.3 53.0 52.9 52.2 55.5 
JTW 54.7 55.1 54.9 54.9 54.9 53.5 53.5 53.3 56.5 56.7 56.6 56.6 56.5 56.7 
LFN 54.3 52.2 51.4 48.9 51.0 53.1 53.0 52.6 52.9 53.6 53.9 53.0 53.7 54.3 
SFN 53.8 51.9 51.0 48.1 50.6 52.8 52.9 52.9 52.9 53.3 53.7 52.3 53.1 53.8 
TWK 57.2 56.9 56.9 56.4 56.4 56.2 56.3 56.2 56.2 56.2 57.1 57.0 57.0 57.2 
Best 57.2 56.9 56.9 56.4 56.4 56.2 56.3 56.2 56.5 56.7 57.1 57.0 57.0 57.2 
Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy O 2nd Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy 3B 
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Method 0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 57.4 46.2 42.3 40.6 44.8 53.3 53.2 52.9 53.2 56.9 56.5 55.5 56.7 57.4 
JTW 57.5 57.2 55.6 53.9 54.9 57.4 57.3 57.1 59.5 60.5 60.3 59.2 59.5 60.5 
LFN 56.6 53.7 50.4 45.9 51.3 56.9 56.5 54.2 56.2 56.8 57.3 54.7 56.7 57.3 
SFN 55.3 53.1 49.2 44.5 50.3 55.9 55.9 55.1 55.4 56.1 56.2 53.5 55.2 56.2 
TWK 58.8 56.6 59.2 55.1 55.1 59.7 60.3 59.3 59.3 59.1 61.7 59.6 59.7 61.7 
Best 58.8 57.2 59.2 55.1 55.1 59.7 60.3 59.3 59.5 60.5 61.7 59.6 59.7 61.7 
Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3A 
 
 




Method 0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 65.2 57.6 57.2 56.7 57.3 58.9 59.2 59.3 58.8 61.4 61.8 61.7 61.3 65.2 
JTW 64.2 64.6 64.4 64.1 64.2 63.1 63.0 62.9 65.4 65.8 65.6 65.5 65.4 65.8 
LFN 63.3 61.8 60.6 57.9 60.5 62.6 62.4 61.0 62.2 62.4 63.1 61.5 62.5 63.3 
SFN 62.5 61.6 60.1 57.4 60.0 62.2 61.8 61.7 61.6 61.9 62.5 60.7 61.8 62.5 
TWK 67.2 66.7 67.1 66.1 66.1 65.9 65.9 65.8 65.8 65.8 66.9 66.5 66.7 67.2 
Best 67.2 66.7 67.1 66.1 66.1 65.9 65.9 65.8 65.8 65.8 66.9 66.5 66.7 67.2 
Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy O 2nd Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy 1B 
 




Method 0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 45.5 26.3 24.8 25.3 25.9 39.6 39.0 39.9 39.0 44.9 44.8 44.1 44.9 45.5 
JTW 47.4 44.0 41.5 38.8 39.9 47.2 47.1 47.0 48.5 49.7 50.1 48.8 48.5 50.1 
LFN 44.7 38.8 35.8 32.3 35.9 45.8 46.1 43.8 45.1 45.5 46.0 43.9 44.8 46.1 
SFN 43.5 38.3 34.8 31.0 35.0 44.8 44.9 44.6 44.3 44.8 45.3 42.9 43.8 45.3 
TWK 46.7 42.7 44.9 40.0 40.0 48.0 48.7 46.8 46.8 46.8 47.5 46.6 46.7 48.7 
Best 47.4 44.0 44.9 40.0 40.0 48.0 48.7 47.0 48.5 49.7 50.1 48.8 48.5 50.1 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3A 
 




Method 0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 54.1 44.6 43.6 42.9 44.1 47.0 47.1 47.2 46.7 49.7 50.0 50.0 49.3 54.1 
JTW 52.8 53.0 52.8 52.4 52.4 50.9 50.9 50.9 54.5 54.9 55.1 55.0 54.5 55.1 
LFN 50.3 46.9 46.2 43.9 45.6 50.1 50.5 49.1 49.9 49.9 50.4 49.2 49.4 50.5 
SFN 49.4 47.0 46.1 43.6 45.4 49.6 50.1 49.7 49.2 49.6 50.1 48.8 49.0 50.1 
TWK 54.4 53.4 54.4 51.5 51.5 53.3 53.9 53.0 53.0 52.9 53.7 53.3 53.2 54.4 
Best 54.4 53.4 54.4 52.4 52.4 53.3 53.9 53.0 54.5 54.9 55.1 55.0 54.5 55.1 
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Table 20 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 15 - HHHL 
Policy 
0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
51.5 39.0 35.0 33.4 37.9 48.6 47.7 47.1 47.7 52.6 51.1 49.8 52.0 52.6 
54.4 51.3 48.4 46.1 47.2 54.5 54.2 53.8 53.8 55.6 55.5 53.7 53.8 55.6 
50.4 46.0 42.5 38.3 42.7 53.0 52.3 48.6 51.3 51.8 52.2 48.9 50.7 53.0 
49.0 46.1 41.4 37.6 41.9 51.6 51.1 50.3 50.1 50.7 50.8 47.7 49.5 51.6 
53.2 50.1 53.2 47.2 47.1 54.9 56.0 53.0 53.0 52.9 55.2 52.5 52.8 56.0 
54.4 51.3 53.2 47.2 47.2 54.9 56.0 53.8 53.8 55.6 55.5 53.7 53.8 56.0 
Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy 
2B 
2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with 
Policy 3A 
             
Table 21 – Individual Revenue Rate results of each simulation for Scenario 16 - HHHH 
 
Policy 
Method 0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 62.9 53.2 51.7 51.3 53.0 55.5 55.5 53.8 55.2 58.3 58.7 58.5 58.2 62.9 
JTW 61.7 62.1 61.7 61.2 61.5 60.3 60.2 60.2 62.6 63.3 63.4 63.0 62.6 63.4 
LFN 58.4 56.2 55.4 52.7 54.4 59.4 59.4 57.1 58.1 58.7 59.2 57.3 57.8 59.4 
SFN 57.4 55.5 54.8 52.2 54.3 58.7 58.6 58.0 57.6 57.9 58.5 56.5 57.1 58.7 
TWK 64.1 62.8 64.1 60.7 60.7 63.4 64.1 62.6 62.6 62.5 64.1 62.8 62.8 64.1 
Best 64.1 62.8 64.1 61.2 61.5 63.4 64.1 62.6 62.6 63.3 64.1 63.0 62.8 64.1 
Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy 
1B 2nd Best Combination is Method TWK with Policy O 
 
Table 22 shows highest net revenue average earning combinations of due date estimation method, overtime 
policy, and overtime rule for each test scenario. 
 
Table 22 – Average Revenue Rate results of all simulations for all Scenarios 
 
Policy 
Method 0 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 3A 3B 3C 3D Best 
AGL 65.2 55.0 53.6 53.1 54.5 59.6 59.2 59.2 59.2 66.3 65.9 65.1 65.8 67.5 
JTW 66.3 65.4 65.8 64.0 64.0 65.4 65.7 65.3 67.9 68.8 71.6 69.9 67.9 71.6 
LFN 63.4 60.5 59.3 55.1 58.5 64.9 65.4 62.3 64.1 64.7 65.7 62.9 63.9 65.9 
SFN 62.0 60.3 58.7 54.3 58.0 64.2 64.7 63.3 63.3 63.8 65.0 61.8 63.0 65.1 
TWK 65.6 65.0 68.1 62.0 63.0 66.8 68.6 65.8 65.8 65.7 68.3 66.0 66.0 69.4 
Best 66.3 65.4 68.1 64.0 64.0 66.8 68.6 65.8 67.9 68.8 71.6 69.9 67.9 71.6 
Mean 67.3 66.3 68.5 64.7 64.6 67.3 68.8 66.8 67.9 68.8 71.9 70.0 68.2 71.9 
Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3B 2nd Best Combination is Method JTW with Policy 3C 
         
Table 23 shows the best and second best combination of method and policy for each scenario for 
maximizing ner revenue rate. Overall, method JTW is the favorite with policy 3 and rule LOS (B).  This 
combination is the best for all busy market scenarios, as well as most unrewarding markets.  In twelve 
scenarios, it is best to bargain, use overtime for tardy jobs, and use overtime in quotations with policy 3.  In 
two scenarios (15, 16), it is best to bargain and use overtime for tardy jobs but not for quotations with 
policy 2.  In the two slack, deterministic scenarios with high responsiveness required (10, 12), it is best to 
bargain but not to use overtime with policy 0.  It is always best to bargain about due dates.  In the fourteen 
scenarios that use overtime, the best shop floor overtime rule is LOS (rule B), which is also the simplest to 
calculate.   
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Table 23 – The Highest Net Revenue Negotiation Strategies for Each Scenario 
 PREM Low Low High High 
AIAT RESP 
PERR 
Low High Low High 
Low Low LLLL          1 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3C 
LLLH          2 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3C 
LLHL          3 
JTW/3B 
TWK/2B 
LLHH          4 
JTW/3B 
TWK/1B 
Low High LHLL          5 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3C 
LHLH          6 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3C 
LHHL        7 
JTW/3B 
JTW/2B 
LHHH          8 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3C 
High Low HLLL          9 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3A 
HLLH        10 
TWK/0 
TWK/3B 
HLHL        11 
TWK/3B 
JTW/3A 
HLHH        12 
TWK/0 
TWK/1B 
High High HHLL        13 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3A 
HHLH        14 
JTW/3B 
JTW/3C 
HHHL      15 
TWK/2B 
JTW/3A 
HHHH        16 
TWK/2B 
TWK/0 
Key; L = Low; H = High 
AIAT/PERR/PREM/RESP   Scenario Number 
Second Best Strategy 
Best Strategies Advantage 
Table 24 shows the difference in revenue rate between the first and second best combinations for each 
scenario. This difference is notable except in Scenarios 9, 12, and 16.  However, the difference between the 
best due date estimation method‟s highest revenue rate and that of the second best method‟s highest is 
always statistically significant, usually at a 99.9% level.  As in previous research (Moodie, 1999) with no 
overtime, methods JTW or TWK are always the best for due date estimation.  TWK is only the best in slack 
markets, especially where customers are prepared to pay most for early delivery.  The best charge rate 
values are related to scenario rather than to overtime policy or to negotiation strategy.  The value of 
uncertainty allowance does not seem to significantly affect the results as long as a value in the range 0.3 to 
3.3 is used.   
Table 24 - Difference in Revenue Rate between Best and Second Best Combinations with Overtime 
Scenario Best  2nd Best Diff. Diff % Significance % S.E. No O/T OT% Adv 
1 81.15 77.93 3.22 3.97 99.9 0.085 71.56 13.40 
2 88.33 86.41 1.92 2.17 99.9 0.087 77.55 13.90 
3 90.66 88.64 2.02 2.23 99.9 0.058 83.60 8.44 
4 102.37 100.99 1.38 1.35 99.9 0.083 93.96 8.95 
5 71.38 68.32 3.06 4.29 99.9 0.077 64.94 9.92 
6 79.37 77.57 1.80 2.27 99.9 0.071 70.27 12.95 
7 80.17 77.31 2.86 3.57 99.9 0.059 75.48 6.21 
8 92.34 90.34 2.00 2.17 99.9 0.077 84.68 9.05 
9 53.83 53.80 0.03 0.06 no 0.083 50.81 5.94 
10 57.23 57.10 0.13 0.23 95.0 0.104 57.23 -0.23 
11 61.70 60.48 1.22 1.98 99.9 0.103 58.79 4.72 
12 67.20 67.12 0.08 0.12 no 0.114 67.20 -0.12 
13 50.14 49.70 0.44 0.88 99.9 0.115 47.39 5.80 
14 55.09 54.97 0.12 0.22 99.0 0.075 54.44 1.19 
15 56.01 55.55 0.46 0.82 99.9 0.072 54.41 2.94 
16 64.14 64.10 0.04 0.06 no 0.085 64.10 0.06 
Mean 71.95 70.65 1.30 1.65 99.5 0.084 67.28 6.44 
Min   0.03 0.06  0.058 47.39 -0.23 
I
 
  www.irmbrjournal.com                                                                                       September 2013                                                                                               
 International Review of Management and Business Research                        Vol. 2 Issue.3















This experiment shows that using overtime in a job shop can help increase net revenue rate in most 
scenarios with this model.  It also shows that the simplest due date estimation methods (JTW, TWK) and 
overtime shop floor rules (LOS) perform the best.  In most scenarios, the firm should consider flexible 
overtime when making quotations (policy 3).  Overtime in a busy market helps meet orders not just by 
creating more processing time, but also by enabling the ordinary time of the plant to be used more 
intensively.  This experiment has demonstrated that simulation can help on testing overtime policies with 
different negotiation strategies and tactics. 
Discussion 
 
Organizations are moving slowly along the continuum of e-marketplaces. Most firms use the Internet for 
communication; many use e-auctions, and a few intelligent agents. However, as yet there has been no real 
use of automated negotiation in regular business transactions. Further developers and researchers seem to 
be trying to produce systems that will conduct the negotiations better than people.  However, it appears the 
need is for systems that, although they may not be as good as people at negotiating, can handle the many 
business transactions that are not negotiated at present due to the cost of negotiating. Organizations will 
probably never allow an automated negotiation system to handle transactions of major importance to the 
organization. However, if an automated negotiation system could handle the many less important and semi-
routine transactions, then this should lead to decreased supply costs. 
The managerial implications are that firms should model their proposed overtime policies and negotiation 
strategies before implementation, using a model of their expected market and actual firm. This should 
improve their pricing and delivery time performance in a competitive environment (Li & Lee 1994). This 
research is a start in exploring how a firm should arrive at and test overtime and negotiation strategies. 
Easton and Moodie (1999) showed that even very small models can give insight. Like most management 
software developments, automated negotiation systems will probably come in small increments and take a 
while to be adopted. Meanwhile, researchers could use simulations to test and develop new systems as 
demonstrated in this paper. 
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